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This article considers the current controversial question of the continuing 
existence of state licensing systems in relation to businesses and 
occupations. While there may be good reasons for such regimes, differing 
requirements in different jurisdictions can have the effect of making it more 
difficult for families and individuals to conduct business in particular 
jurisdictions, and can inhibit them from moving between jurisdictions. 
These restrictions could, in the view of economists, lead to inefficient use of 
human resources. The article considers the extent to which section 92 of the 
Constitution might be invoked to challenge such regulations, bearing in 
mind past case law on the section and the recent Betfair decision. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The extent of regulation over the right to work in particular fields is of on-
going concern in Australia. Regulations prescribing the requirements to work 
in particular fields are currently largely state-based. While there may be good 
reasons for this, different regimes create various anomalies. In this paper, I 
outline the practical difficulties caused by the present patchwork quilt of 
different regimes regulating the right to work in particular fields, before 
considering the extent to which Australia’s constitutional arrangements might 
cut red tape in this regard. In so doing, I shall consider a recent High Court 
decision in some detail, and an account will be given of how this issue has 
been dealt with in other parts of the world. Of course, as with many other 
issues, this issue is not one confronting only Australia. It confronts other 
federal systems as well.    
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II THE PROBLEM 
The problem of multiple business licensing schemes and of the recognition of 
qualifications obtained in other jurisdictions has at least been recognised by 
government, with the issue of national recognition of trade qualifications 
being on the Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) list of Top 10 
hotspots, or worst regulatory impediments to economic activity.1 The 
Business Council of Australia has counted 149 occupational licensing 
schemes in New South Wales, 136 in Victoria, 87 in Western Australia, 69 in 
the Australian Capital Territory, and 47 at the Commonwealth level.2
The current arrangements might have made sense in a past era, but are 
increasingly questionable today. There is clear evidence that business is 
increasingly being done across state lines. By the end of the 2007 financial 
year, more than 31 700 businesses in Australia were operating in more than 
one jurisdiction, with 4300 operating in all nine jurisdictions. This figure has 
increased by 70 per cent since 2003.
  
3
The problems caused by multiple licensing schemes were identified by the 
Australian National Training Authority (ANTA), in its 2002 Report A Licence 
to Skill.
  
4 ANTA had been required to develop training packages at the 
national level, in an effort to create an integrated national vocational 
education and training system. These packages would ensure that people 
wishing to enter particular trades had a series of defined skills and abilities. 
However, the Report found that these packages were not being used by all 
bodies responsible for industry licensing.5
                                                 
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Southern Queensland. Thanks to the 
anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 Often additional factors were being 
used as the basis for determining competency in a particular field; sometimes 
the factors used were actually inconsistent with the nationally developed 
1 The list comprises rail safety regulation, occupational health and safety, national trade 
measurement, chemicals and plastics, development assessment arrangements, building 
regulations, environmental assessment and approvals processes, business name, Australian 
Business Number and related business registration processes, personal property securities, and 
product safety. 
2 Access Economics Pty Ltd for the Business Council of Australia, Reshaping Australia’s 
Federation: A New Contract for Federal-State Relations; Appendix 2, ‘The Costs of 
Federalism’ (2006) 30. 
3 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Counts of Australian Businesses, Including Entries and Exits, 
June 2003 to June 2007, No 8165.0 (December 2007). 
4 ANTA, A Licence to Skill (2002)(‘Licence to Skill’)  
<http://www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/CE7470E2-4D4A-44B4-866A-
42E0C592D4D7/10799/ANTAA_Licence_to_Skill.pdf> at 20 October 2009. 
5 Ibid 1, 52. 
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standards. Requirements continued to differ across jurisdictions.6 The 
problem had been recognised earlier, leading to the signing in 1992 of the 
Australian Mutual Recognition Agreement7 involving the states and 
territories. The Agreement aimed to create mutual recognition of standards in 
states and territories regarding goods and occupations. However, the 
Agreement had its limitations.8
The idea of creating nationally-based requirements to assess workplace 
competency was to reduce ‘barriers to the mobility of labour between 
jurisdictions’.
 Further, while there is an ongoing COAG 
process to fix the identified problems with incomplete mutual recognition of 
qualifications, progress has been slower than first anticipated. 
9 Existing licensing regimes inhibited this.10 Some specific 
examples include hairdressing, where no licence is necessary in Victoria but is 
required in New South Wales. A Victorian hairdresser wishing to move to 
New South Wales would have to study at a NSW TAFE in order to gain a 
NSW licence. Similarly in nursing – a Northern Territory nurse working as an 
immunisation provider can do so without a licence in the Northern Territory; 
however if she/he wished to move to Victoria, she/he would need to undertake 
a further VET course.11 The Productivity Commission has noted the negative 
impact of state-based licensing systems on competition.12
                                                 
6 The Report refers to this as the ‘rail gauge’ problem, in terms of training, with analogies to the 
problems associated with different rail gauges in Australia. 
 
7 Council of Australian Governments  
<http://www.coag.gov.au/mutual_recognition/docs/mra_text.pdf> at 20 October 2009.  
8 Licence to Skill, above n 4, 6. Specifically, it did not assist where occupations were regulated 
differently across jurisdictions, and did not assist where workplace requirements were 
mandated by legislation, but for which no licence or registration was issued. 
9 Ibid 9. As well as to improve consistency in the regulatory requirements of jurisdictional 
industry regulatory authorities, provide a sound basis to improve the mutual recognition of 
occupational licences between jurisdictions, and provide a strong foundation from which to 
develop nationally consistent regulatory regimes. 
10 Ibid 21. 
11 ANTA, Review of the Mutual Recognition Agreement – The Implications of Occupational 
Licensing for the Implementation of National Training Packages (Submission to the 
Productivity Commission from the Australian National Training Authority) (2003). 
12 ‘Licensing has costs. Apart from compliance and administration costs, by restricting entry, it 
can reduce competition with the usual adverse outcomes for consumers. Hence, it is important 
that licensing is not over-used.... of the total of nearly 100 occupations licensed by the States 
and Territories for consumer policy reasons, more than 30 are licensed in only one or two 
jurisdictions... In some cases (eg hairdressing), the prima facie case for specific requirements 
seems very weak’: Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework, Inquiry Report No 45, (30 April 2008) vol 1, 27.  
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Economists would find such barriers to the free movement of labour to be 
inefficient. Access Economics addressed this issue in its recent paper, The 
Costs of Federalism:13
The States often stop the right person being in the right job – or, at least, 
make them go through duplicated regulatory hoops to do in one State 
something they have already qualified to practice [sic] in another State.  
 
This is a big problem. Each State and Territory grants licences to practice 
[sic] in lots of occupations ...14
It is important to ensure that people have the necessary skills to practice 
[sic] particular occupations. But it is rather less clear that the licensing 
practices and procedures couldn’t be much better co-ordinated and 
harmonised than they are … 
  
All too often, someone licensed in one State cannot readily practise in 
another. That is typically a triumph of bureaucracy over common sense. 
And while some progress has been made in individual sectors towards 
overcoming the impediments to a mobile workforce arising from such State-
based licensing systems, no consistent approach to resolving the problems 
has been devised.15
As the Business Council of Australia noted recently in relation to restrictions 
on the labour market and business regulation more generally: 
 
Unnecessarily complex business regulation means that businesses continue 
to face needless delays, increased compliance costs, more expensive inputs, 
and difficulties in transferring qualified staff to the places they are most 
needed. These differences create barriers to growth by making businesses 
more expensive to run, less able to expand, less inclined to develop new 
products and markets, less able to compete effectively and, ultimately, less 
profitable. In turn, Australians face higher prices, fewer choices and more 
restricted employment opportunities than might otherwise be the case. And 
                                                 
13 Above n 2. 
14 Builders, plumbers, electricians, electrical mechanics, fitters, engineers, installing, 
maintaining and servicing air conditioners and refrigeration, security guards, locksmiths, 
bodyguards, who can own a gun, aircraft engineers, and manager of investment products are 
all cited. 
15 Ibid 30-1. Treasury Secretary Ken Henry has also noted these issues, concluding that ‘we do 
not have a national labour market’, and citing occupations such as electricians and 
hairdressers where, although mutual recognition is in place, problems of categorisation in the 
case of electricians and of work experience requirements in the case of hairdressers, inhibit 
the transferability of such skills: Productivity Commission, Time to Get Real on National 
Productivity Reform in Productive Reform in a Federal System, Roundtable Proceedings 
(2006) 340. 
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the increased cost of administration for governments raises the tax burden 
for everyone. 
When all of this is added together, it is clear that our current regulatory 
systems help prevent the Australian economy from operating at its potential. 
They represent an antiquated and anachronistic framework that stands in 
direct contrast to Australia’s moves to reduce international regulatory 
barriers through the pursuit of its free trade agenda and other international 
economic arguments.16
Some have argued that the debate here reflects a larger debate between neo-
classical economic thought, favouring decentralised economic policy and 
reduced national power to coordinate economic decision-making, and a 
Keynesian approach, favouring a macroeconomic view of the economy as an 
organic whole.
 
17 Links can be seen between this debate and the jurisprudence 
of the United States Supreme Court.18
The Business Council argues that businesses should be able to transfer willing 
employees to areas where they are needed, without having to worry whether 
their qualifications were transferable. Businesses should be able to conduct 
the same business in different states, without having to re-apply for the same 
licences.
 
19 The current (excess) regulation makes it difficult for Australian 
businesses to compete in international markets against companies from 
countries with less regulation. The Council points to the substantial resources 
that must sometimes be devoted to compliance with the rules, causing some 
businesses to think twice about expanding, and resulting in an opportunity 
cost of economic activity forgone.20
                                                 
16 Business Council of Australia, Towards a Seamless Economy: Modernising the Regulation of 
Australian Business (2008) 8. 
 
17 Steven Gey, ‘The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1989) 17 New York 
University Review of Law and Social Change 1, 18-23. Gey refers to the ‘neo-classical 
axioms that the nation’s economy can be subdivided into local and national spheres, and the 
corresponding policy determination that the states should be given substantial responsibility 
for economic regulation’: at 52. 
18 In an early case, Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v Ogden (1824) 22 US 1 decided upon a 
broad definition of commerce, including commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of 
nations in all its branches; he refuted the suggestion that commerce was confined to traffic, 
buying or selling or the interchange of commodities. Cf cases giving Congress narrower 
power over commerce, such as decisions prohibiting Congress from regulating corporate 
governance; Bank of Augusta v Earle (1839) 38 US 519; and Cooley v Board of Wardens 
(1851) 53 US 299. 
19 Above n 16, 11. 
20 Ibid 23. The Business Council of Australia in its 2008 Report concludes that nothing has yet 
come of past COAG commitments to reform trade measurement, but notes a re-commitment 
by COAG in December 2007, in the form of a working party, to consider issues such as trade 
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III SOLUTION? THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 92 OF 
 THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION 
Though we might hope that the above problems could be resolved through 
COAG, it will be suggested that another way in which the above challenge 
can be resolved is through section 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution. 
Section 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution is one of the most litigated 
sections, providing a guarantee that ‘trade, commerce and intercourse among 
the States shall be absolutely free’. It is one of the key provisions of the 
Constitution, reflecting one of the key reasons for the creation of Australia – 
the concern to encourage free trade between the colonies under a common 
external tariff. Much debate has concerned the question of identifying 
precisely what it is from which trade, commerce and intercourse are to be 
free. There have been many challenges to state business regulations based on 
the section, and, to a more limited extent, to Commonwealth regulations. 
Perhaps the most famous use of the section was to thwart the Federal 
Government’s plans for a nationalised banking system in Australia.21 The 
section was radically re-interpreted in the 1988 Cole v Whitfield22 decision to 
prohibit (only) laws that discriminated against interstate trade and commerce 
for protectionist purposes.23
Recently, the section was used by the High Court of Australia to strike down 
state legislation seeking to regulate an Internet betting regime operating from 
Tasmania. The case reflects the first challenge to attempts by states to regulate 
Internet commerce. It may herald the start of other such challenges, and it is 
submitted that the case might have broader implications for the states in terms 
of business regulation. I will explain the case and what it decided, before 
considering some of the possible implications of the decision.  
  
                                                                                                                    
and professional recognition: 27. Problems with the lack of harmonisation of the trade and 
professional licensing were also noted by the Business Council in its report Reshaping 
Australia’s Federation: A New Contract for Federal-State Relations (2006) and Business 
Council of Australia Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems (2006). 
21 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1. 
22 (1988) 165 CLR 360. See, for discussion, Dennis Rose, ‘Cole v Whitfield: ‘Absolutely’ Free 
Trade?’ in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 
335. 
23 Amelia Simpson ‘Grounding the High Court’s Modern Section 92 Jurisprudence: The Case 
for Improper Purpose as the Touchstone’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 445. I will refer to 
literature critiquing the Cole test later in this article. 
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A The Decision – Betfair Pty Limited v Western 
 Australia 
Betfair held a licence under Tasmanian law to operate a ‘betting exchange’. 
Betfair uploaded onto its computer server information about each sporting 
event in Australia on which bets could be placed. Registered customers of 
Betfair could call or e-mail through bets to its Hobart headquarters. This kind 
of betting differed from more orthodox betting, in that in effect customers 
were betting with one another rather than through a centralised body such as a 
TAB (often government-connected), or with a bookmaker. Customers could 
bet on particular events happening or not happening. Some of Betfair’s 
customers were in Western Australia, and some of the events upon which 
Betfair took bets occurred in Western Australia.  
The Western Australian Parliament passed the Betting and Racing Legislation 
Amendment Act 2006 (WA), which inserted sections 24(1aa) and 27D(1) into 
the Betting Control Act 1954 (WA). Section 24(1aa) made it an offence for a 
person to bet through a betting exchange. Section 27D(1) of the Act made it 
an offence to publish or otherwise make available a Western Australian race 
field in the course of business, unless prior approval had been obtained. 
Betfair had not obtained the required approval. Betfair successfully 
challenged the amendments, arguing that they breached the section 92 free 
trade and commerce protection enshrined in the Constitution.24
The result was unanimous.
 
25
The High Court dismissed the arguments for Western Australia that appeared 
to assume that states had to retain an area over which they could pass business 
laws, even where laws regarding the Internet were concerned: 
 
To focus upon the geographic dimension given by State boundaries, when 
considering competition in a market in internet commerce, presents 
practical and conceptual difficulties. Yet, Western Australia and supporting 
State interveners emphasised that s 92 permanently mandates that each State 
                                                 
24 (2008) 234 CLR 418 (‘Betfair’). See for discussion Eli Ball, ‘Section 92 and the Regulation 
of E-Commerce: A Casenote on Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia’ (2008) 36 Federal Law 
Review 265; Amelia Simpson ‘Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia’ (2008) 19 Public Law 
Review 191. 
25 Joint reasons were given by Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, 
with Heydon J delivering a judgment with the same effect. 
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retain its own ‘economic centre’. That proposition, as will appear from what 
is said later in these reasons, is overbroad.26
The joint reasons, in considering comments made by the Court in its 1990 
section 92 decision in Castlemaine Tooheys v South Australia,
 
27
[a]ppear to discount the significance of movement of persons across 
Australia, and of instantaneous commercial communication, and to look 
back to a time of physically distinct communities located within colonial 
borders and separated by the tyranny of distance.
 note that the 
earlier reasons  
28
The joint reasons in Betfair appeared to widen the immunity provided by 
section 92. The reasons referred to comments in Castlemaine that account 
would be taken of the ‘fundamental consideration’ that a state legislature had 
power to enact legislation for the well-being of its people.
 
29 The joint reasons 
in Betfair concluded that such a consideration would not support much 
modern state regulatory legislation in the ‘new economy’.30
In considering developments since its 1988 decision on section 92, the High 
Court highlighted the National Competition Policy, formulated under the 
auspices of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), including the 
guiding principle that legislation should not restrict competition unless it can 
be shown 1) that the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole 
outweigh the costs, and 2) that the objectives of the legislation could only be 
achieved by restricting competition.
 
31
In the Court’s extensive use of economic literature in Betfair, it noted that one 
of the reasons for Australia federating was to facilitate trade among the 
 
                                                 
26 Betfair (2008) 234 CLR 418, 452; the joint reasons referred to the new economy, in which 
internet-dependent businesses like the one considered here operate readily and deal with 
customers without regard to geographic boundaries. 
27 (1990) 169 CLR 436 (‘Castlemaine Tooheys’). 
28 Betfair (2008) 234 CLR 418, 453. 
29 Ibid 473 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
30 Ibid 474. As expressed by the Business Council of Australia, ‘as the world globalises, 
barriers to the free movement of people, goods and services within Australia become 
increasingly anachronistic’: Business Council of Australia, Reshaping Australia's Federation: 
A New Contract for Federal-State Relations (2006) 1. See also Geoffrey Sawer: ‘if the result 
is eventually to leave the concept of “intrastate trade” almost empty, as it now is in the United 
States, this is merely the inevitable consequence of national economic integration’: Australian 
Federalism in the Courts (1967) 206; and Gey: ‘In the modern world, every commercial 
activity is part of interstate commerce’: ‘The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause’: (1989) 17 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 1, 76.  
31 Betfair (2008) 234 CLR 418, 452. 
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colonies, and that political economists of the era had concluded that free 
commercial intercourse was one of the most distinctive marks of national 
unity.32
[t]he creation and fostering of national markets would further the plan of the 
Constitution for the creation of a new federal nation and would be 
expressive of national unity.
 The Court concluded that 
33
Sometimes state governments could be susceptible to local pressures to make 
decisions adverse to those outside the state.
 
34
The joint reasons accepted that some regulation of interstate trade and 
commerce was necessary, and state laws operating in this field could be 
validated if they satisfied a criterion of ‘reasonable necessity’, which might be 
slightly more difficult to satisfy than previously expressed limits.
 
35 Their 
Honours admitted that the claimed objective of the Western Australian 
government in passing the law, supposedly to ‘preserve the integrity of 
betting’, might have some justification. However, the total ban on betting 
exchanges and the prohibition on publishing lists was not proportionate or 
appropriate and adapted to the propounded legislative object.36
                                                 
32 Ibid 455, citing Sir Robert Palgrave, Dictionary of Political Economy (2nd ed, 1896) 45-6. 
 
33 Ibid 452. 
34 Ibid 460; they cited here Professor Tribe: ‘[t]hat recognition reflects not a cynical view of the 
failings of statesmanship at a sub-federal level, but only an understanding that the proper 
structural role of state lawmakers is to protect and promote the interests of their own 
constituents. That role is one that they will inevitably try to fulfil even at the expense of 
citizens of other states … [i]n this context, the rhetoric of judicial deference to the 
democratically fashioned judgments of legislatures is often inapposite. The checks on which 
we rely to curb the abuse of legislative power – election and recall – are simply unavailable to 
those who have no effective voice or vote in the jurisdiction which harms them. This problem 
is most acute when a state enacts commercial laws that regulate extraterritorial trade, so that 
unrepresented outsiders are affected even if they do not cross the state’s borders’: American 
Constitutional Law (3rd ed, 2000) 1051-2.  
35 In Cole v Whitfield, the court would have allowed ‘genuine’ state laws regulating commerce 
(403), where the law had a ‘real object’ of prescribing standards, (1988) 165 CLR 360, 408. 
In Castlemaine Tooheys, the court used the concept of ‘acceptable explanation or 
justification’, (1990) 169 CLR 436, 477, in Barley Marketing Board (NSW) v Norman, the 
question was whether the burden on interstate trade was ‘incidental’ to the attainment of a 
non-protectionist object and not disproportionate, (1990) 171 CLR 182, 199. 
36 Betfair (2008) 234 CLR 418, 479. 
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B Free Movement of Labour and the Right to Trade 
 Have Been Recognised Internationally 
The High Court of Australia has recently shown itself to be increasingly 
willing to consider international developments in areas to which it turns its 
attention.37
In the European Union, the free movement of persons from one Member State 
to another is recognised as one of the four fundamental freedoms of Union 
law. It is derived from article 39 (freedom of movement for workers), article 
43 (freedom of establishment), and article 49 (freedom to provide services).
 Forces of globalisation have created an increased recognition that 
our legal challenges have, more often than not, been faced by other countries. 
While the laws of a country are an expression of the sovereignty of its people, 
it makes sense in dealing with legal challenges to at least consider how these 
challenges have been dealt with elsewhere. The High Court in its Betfair 
decision referred to relevant American material, and it is submitted that the 
Australian law in this area could benefit from consideration of both European 
and American literature concerning the right of individuals to move around 
within a federation, and to provide services across jurisdictional boundaries, 
without undue restriction. 
38 
Directives have been issued and cases decided in relation to general 
recognition of both professional education39 and vocational education.40 They 
are to the effect that these qualifications must be recognised in all Member 
States, and another Member State is not entitled to deny practice rights to a 
person qualified in a Member State on the basis of inadequate qualifications.41
                                                 
37 For example, Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162. 
 
38 So, for example, the requirement that an employer wishing to acquire an employee from 
another Member State pay a fee was held to be offensive to article 39: Union Royale Belge 
des Sociétés de Football Association v Bosman (C-415/93) [1995] ECR I-4921. Individuals 
have a right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up businesses 
under the same conditions as those laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country 
where such establishment is effected. There has been a move by the European Court of Justice 
to extend these rights of movement beyond merely economic rights, to include social and 
family rights: Trojani v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale de Bruxelles (C-456/02) (2004) ECR 
7573; Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (C-138/02) (2004) ECR I-2703. 
39 Council Directive 89/48 and 2001/19/EC [2001] OJ L 206; Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 
[2004] OJ (L158) 77; European Commission, Reform of the System for the Recognition of 
Professional Qualifications (2005); European Commission, The European Qualifications 
Framework: A New Way to Understand Qualifications Across Europe (2006); Reyners v 
Belgian State (C-2/74) (1974) ECR 631. 
40 Directive 92/51/EEC [1992] OJ L 209 and Directive 2001/19/EC [2001] OJ L 206; Hocsman 
v Ministre de l’Emploi (C-238/98) [2000] ECR I-6623. 
41 Horatia Muir Watt, ‘European Integration, Legal Diversity and the Conflict of Laws’ (2005) 
9 Edinburgh Law Review 6, 26. Watt says that if one Member State failed to recognise 
qualifications obtained in another state, it would destroy the competitive advantage conferred 
by the home state’s potentially different legislation. 
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State restrictions on the entitlement of a non-resident to practise in the state 
have been strictly limited.42 A European lawyer cannot be required to take 
more than one bar exam.43 Each Member State must recognise a company 
registered in another Member State, and cannot impose extra requirements on 
that company before allowing it to trade.44
It has been recognised that the object of these provisions is to encourage the 
optimal allocation of resources within the Union and to maximise wealth 
creation.
 
45
The experience in the United States is similar, and the High Court of Australia 
referred to the American equivalent provisions in its Betfair decision. Clearly 
there are historical parallels in terms of the movement to federation and the 
concern to reduce commercial wars between states.
 
46
                                                 
42 The European Court of Justice found in Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e 
Procuratori di Milano (Case C-55/94) [1995] ECR I-4165, that national measures liable to 
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty 
(including the right to freedom of movement) were only valid if they (a) were applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner (b) were justified by imperative requirements in the public interest 
(c) must be suitable to attain the objective they pursue, and (d) they must not go beyond what 
is necessary to attain it. A regulation requiring members of the Paris Bar to have only one 
office, and for it to be in France, was struck out by the European Court of Justice in Klopp v 
Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris (Case 107/83) (1984) ECR 2971. See for further 
discussion Paul Craig and Grainne De Burga, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed, 
2003) 772-85; Francesca Strumia, ‘Citizenship and Free Movement: European and American 
Features of a Judicial Formula for Increased Comity’ (2006) 12 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 713, and Gonzalo Villalta Puig, ‘Free Movement of Goods: The European 
Experience in the Australian Context’ (2001) 75(10) Australian Law Journal 639, and 
Gonzalo Villalta Puig, ‘A European Saving Test for Section 92 of the Australian Constitution’ 
(2008) 13(1) Deakin Law Review 99. 
 The right to freedom of 
interstate trade and commerce, and to movement around the federation, is 
43 Francesca Strumia, ‘Citizenship and Free Movement: European and American Features of a 
Judicial Formula for Increased Comity’ (2006) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 713, 
749. 
44 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd (C-167/01) [2003] 
ECR I-10155. 
45 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed, 2003) 581. To 
like effect see Chandra Shah and Michael Long, ‘Labour Mobility and the Mutual 
Recognition of Skills and Qualifications: European Union and Australia/New Zealand’ 
(Working Paper No 65, Centre for the Economics of Education and Training, Monash 
University, 2000) 4: ‘The European Commission considers capacity for occupational mobility 
to be essential if the EU economy was to be efficient and competitive in the global market and 
if skills imbalances across sectors and regions were to be alleviated. The critical factor in 
building this capacity requires the development of the human capital potential of the union’s 
citizens together with the processes for its recognition and transferability across borders’. 
46 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 387, referring to intercolonial free trade as a ‘lion in 
the path’ of federation; H P Hood and Sons Inc v Du Mond (1949) 336 US 525, 533-4. 
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recognised in at least three places within the US Constitution.47 These 
provisions can be read together as reflecting a desire to protect and promote 
the cohesiveness of the federal union.48 The obvious equivalents to these 
provisions in the Australian Constitution are sections 9249 and 117.50
A recent US Supreme Court decision referred to a citizen’s ‘right to travel’ 
being protected by the privileges and immunities clause.
  
51 Article 4 of the 
United States Constitution has been used to successfully attack state 
legislation imposing residency requirements or providing lesser benefits or 
higher fees for non-residents.52
                                                 
47 Article 1, section 8 allows Congress to pass laws regulating interstate trade, and article 4, 
section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment provide that the citizens of each state shall be 
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. 
 Under the dormant commerce clause, states’ 
requirements that sellers of particular products, such as liquor, should possess 
a state-issued licence have been struck down, even if the licence is potentially 
48 Jide Nzelibe, ‘Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation’ (1999) 49 American University 
Law Review 433, 445; Brannon Denning, ‘Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine’ (2003) 88 Minnesota 
Law Review 384. 
49 Murphy J expressly referred to the American authorities in terms of the constitutional right to 
travel in Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556, 582 (he then compared 
these authorities with s 92 jurisprudence in Australia). 
50 Embodying the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of residence. Mason CJ, in 
the landmark s 117 case of Street v Qld Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 491, referred 
with approval to art 4 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States. Section 117 was 
inspired by the American provisions: George Winterton et al, Australian Federal 
Constitutional Law: Commentary and Materials (2nd ed, 2007) 661; Clifford Pannam, 
‘Discrimination on the Basis of State Residence in Australia and the United States’ (1967) 6 
Melbourne University Law Review 105. I do not dwell in detail in this article on the 
requirements of s 117, but there is a high degree of overlap between that section and section 
92, given that they both embrace a prohibition on discrimination against a thing or person that 
has the characteristic of interstatedness.  
51 Saenz v Roe (1999) 526 US 489. The right was infringed by a Californian law restricting the 
welfare benefits available to a newly arrived resident compared with a long-term resident. See 
also Shapiro v Thompson (1969) 394 US 618; United States v Guest (1966) 383 US 745; and 
Edwards v California (1941) 314 US 160; cf Wilson Pasley, ‘The Revival of ‘Privileges and 
Immunities’ and the Controversy Over State Bar Admission Requirements: The Makings of a 
Future Constitutional Dilemma’ (2002) 11 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 1239. 
52 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v Piper (1985) 470 US 274 (inhouse residency 
requirements for bar membership invalid) (with obvious similarities to the Australian case of 
Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461; United Building and Construction 
Trades Council v Mayor of Camden (1984) 465 US 208 (residency requirement for 
employment on state-funded projects invalid); Austin v New Hampshire (1975) 420 US 656 
(state imposition of higher tax rate for non-residents invalid); Saenz v Roe (1999) 526 US 489 
(lower benefits to newly arrived residents of California compared with benefits to long-term 
residents invalid); and Toomer v Witsell (1984) 334 US 385 (higher commercial shrimp 
licence fees for nonresidents invalid); cf Gillian Metzger, ‘Congress, Article IV and Interstate 
Relations’ (2007) 120(6) Harvard Law Review 1468. 
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obtainable by the out-of-state business, because of the inferred protectionist 
purpose of the legislation.53 A state requirement that an out-of-state liquor 
seller have some physical presence in the state in order to sell online to 
customers there has been recently struck down as contrary to the dormant 
commerce clause, on the basis of discrimination against interstate traders.54 
The Supreme Court considered that the scheme raised the costs for out-of-
state producers which would likely be passed on to customers and make their 
products less financially viable. Arguments by the states that they were trying 
to discourage purchase of alcohol online by minors (and that the legislation 
was therefore legitimate regulation) were not accepted.55
Legislation can be attacked by use of the dormant commerce clause either 
because it discriminates against interstate trade and commerce, or because it 
unreasonably burdens interstate commerce.
  
56 Links have been acknowledged 
with competition law here.57
Considering a Rhode Island statute which defined debt collecting as legal 
practice and then limited such collecting to licensed Rhode Island lawyers, the 
First Circuit found the law unconstitutional under the dormant commerce 
clause: 
  
By defining all debt collection as the practice of law, and limiting this 
practice to members of the Rhode Island bar, Rhode Island effectively bars 
out-of-staters from offering a commercial service within its borders and 
confers the right to provide that service – and to reap the associated 
                                                 
53 Heald v Engler 342 F 3d 517 (6th Cir, 2003), cert denied; Dickerson v Bailey 336 F 3d 388 
(5th Cir, 2003); and Beskind v Easley 325 F 3d 506 (4th Cir, 2003). The possible applicability 
of the Twenty-First Amendment is outside the scope of this article. 
54 Note that discrimination was found although it could have been argued that the requirements 
of presence within the state applied equally to interstate and local traders. 
55 Granholm v Heald (2005) 544 US 460 (Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer JJ; 
Rehnquist CJ, Stevens, O’Connor and Thomas JJ dissenting). The court also referred to the 
fact that the legislation would likely have the effect of reducing competition. 
56 Oregon Waste Systems Inc v Department of Environmental Quality (1994) 511 US 93; Maine 
v Taylor (1986) 477 US 131; Pike v Bruce Church Inc (1970) 397 US 137; Granholm v Heald 
(2005) 544 US 460; Donald Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1986) 84(6) Michigan Law Review 1091. 
Arguments that the state legislation is justified on public policy grounds will be considered 
but are often unsuccessful: David Day, ‘The “Mature” Rehnquist Court and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Expanded Discrimination Tier’ (2007) 52 South Dakota Law 
Review 1. 
57 Justice Cardozo found that the commerce clause forbade a state law burdening interstate 
trade and commerce ‘when the avowed purpose of the [law] as well as its necessary tendency 
is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the States’: Baldwin v 
GAF Seelig Inc (1935) 294 US 511, 522. 
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economic benefit – upon a class largely composed of Rhode Island 
citizens.58
The right of a citizen to live and work where he/she wishes, to earn a living by 
any lawful means, and to pursue any vocation, has also been recognised by 
the Supreme Court as protected by the Constitution.
  
59 An ordinance requiring 
an employer of any person moving into the area, or changing jobs in the area, 
to obtain identifying particulars such as fingerprints from their new employee 
have been struck out.60 The Court has found that people may come within the 
definition of commerce.61
C Some Australian Precedents   
 
There have been some past examples where the High Court and Privy Council 
have considered state business licensing schemes in the context of section 92. 
These cases pre-date the 1988 watershed decision in Cole v Whitfield,62
                                                 
58 National Revenue Corp v Violet 807 F 2d 285 (1st Cir, 1986) [14]. As Charles Wolfram puts 
it ‘the states [today] are by and large quite restrictive about admitting out-of-state lawyers … 
The reasons given for the restrictions are probably largely pious eyewash. The real 
motivation, one strongly suspects, has to do with cutting down on the economic threat posed 
for in-state lawyers … by competition with out-of-state lawyers’: ‘Sneaking Around in the 
Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers’ (1995) 
36 South Texas Law Review 665, 679; Gerard Clark, ‘The Two Faces of Multijurisdictional 
Practice’ (2002) 29 North Kentucky Law Review 251; Andrew Perlman, ‘A Bar Against 
Competition: The Unconstitutionality of Admission Rules for Out of State Lawyers’ (2004) 
18 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 135; cf Dent v State of West Virginia (1889) 129 US 
114, where the Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to require proof of evidence of a 
certain level of skill and knowledge in order for a person to be allowed to practise a 
profession. The dominant view in the United States mirrors the High Court of Australia’s 
rejection of residency requirements as a basis for practising law within an Australian 
jurisdiction under s 117: Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461. 
 and 
for this reason their continuing correctness must be firmly questioned. 
However, some of the issues with which earlier cases grappled remain current 
post-Cole. For example, it has always been accepted, and continues to be 
accepted, that the section cannot be read and applied literally to proscribe any 
laws that impact on interstate trade and commerce. It has been the case, and 
continues to be the case, that at least some state regulation is acceptable. The 
question is always where the line should be drawn. The examples below 
59 In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment see: Allgeyer v Louisiana (1897) 165 US 578 
(Justice Peckham) and John Harrison, ‘Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause’ 
(1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 1385. 
60 Service Machine and Shipbuilding Corp v Edwards 617 F 2d 70 (5th Cir), affirmed 101 S Ct 
310 (1980). 
61 Ibid. 
62 (1988) 165 CLR 360. 
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suggest where the line has been drawn in contexts relevant to the focus of this 
article. 
Perhaps the leading example was Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v State of New 
South Wales,63
[s]uch a law differs vitally from a prohibition subject to obtaining a licence 
which may be granted or withheld at discretion. The only reason why such a 
system would not be regarded as satisfactory in such legislation as that now 
under consideration is that such legislation is not really concerned – or at 
any rate is by no means solely concerned – with the safety of public 
transport. It is concerned very largely with restricting the development, in 
competition with existing railways, of modern and convenient methods of 
transport, and one of its supposed advantages is that the discretion to 
withhold licences can be used to protect the trade of one State at the 
expense of another. It is, for example, obviously within the sphere of 
practical politics that it should be thought in Melbourne that Cootamundra 
ought to drink Victorian beer and not South Australian beer. The protection 
of the industries of one State against those of another State was, of course, 
one of the primary things which s 92 was designed to prevent, but, if the 
legislation now in question is valid, effect can easily be given to such an 
opinion without anybody knowing anything about it.
 concerning New South Wales transport regulations which 
prohibited a person from operating a public motor vehicle without a licence. 
A public motor vehicle was defined as one that was used in the course of any 
trade or business. The Act provided for the licensing authority to have regard 
to various factors in assessing an application. A unanimous Privy Council 
struck down the Act as being offensive to section 92. In doing so, the Privy 
Council discussed building by-laws which provided that compliance with 
them gave the lodger an as-of-right approval to commence work. Such an 
approach would be valid, according to the Privy Council, but 
64
                                                 
63 (1954) 93 CLR 1. 
 
64 Ibid 27-8. The author is wary of relying on comments in a section 92 case decided prior to 
Cole, which changed the landscape. However it is submitted that these comments are relevant 
post Cole in as far as they refer to the purpose of the legislation. The High Court in Cole 
required that, in order that section 92 apply, the law be passed for a protectionist purpose, and 
the quotation above is similar in considering the reason for the passage of legislation to be 
relevant to its constitutionality under section 92 – whether it be to preserve public safety or to 
deter competition. The quotation also refers to the understandable tendency for a regional 
government to seek to preserve its local industry, a sentiment reiterated in the Betfair 
decision: ‘legislators in one political subdivision may be susceptible to pressures which 
encourage decisions adverse to the commercial and other interests of those who are not their 
constituents and not their taxpayers’: (2008) 234 CLR 418, 459. 
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In North Eastern Dairy Co Limited v Dairy Authority of New South Wales,65 a 
Victorian milk producer sold milk to customers in New South Wales, contrary 
to New South Wales provisions requiring that any milk sold in the State be 
pasteurised by the holder of a New South Wales licence. This milk had not 
been so pasteurised. A majority of the Court found the legislation to be invalid 
due to section 92. Barwick CJ found that the legislation was attempting to 
allow New South Wales producers to monopolise the supply of milk.66 
Although it was laudable to seek to provide wholesome milk, as was arguably 
the purpose of this legislation, this was not the only practical way to achieve 
that purpose.67 It was not established that milk pasteurised in accordance with 
Victorian law was less wholesome than that of New South Wales.68 The 
regulations directly produced the result that a trader could not lawfully sell 
within the State a commodity of commerce, except on terms dictated by the 
State.69
Mason J referred to a test of discrimination that would later find support by 
the unanimous court in Cole: 
  
The legislature has selected a mode of regulation which ... is calculated to 
burden, indeed to destroy, the interstate trade in pasteurised milk, in 
preference to other modes of regulation which would involve no 
discrimination against the Victorian product. As the defendant has failed to 
show that the discriminatory mode of regulation selected is necessary for 
the protection of public health, it is in my judgment not a reasonable 
regulation of the interstate trade in pasteurised milk.70
It can be noted here that Mason J found the state regulation discriminatory 
against interstate trade, although the requirement that milk be pasteurised by a 
licence holder applied regardless of the source from which the milk came. 
 
                                                 
65 (1975) 134 CLR 559. See similarly Dean Milk Co v Madison (1951) 340 US 349, where the 
United States Supreme Court struck out an ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk if it was not 
pasteurised within a five mile radius of the town square. 
66 To like effect, Mason J stated: ‘the legislation … is calculated to burden, indeed to destroy, 
the interstate trade in pasteurised milk, in preference to other modes of regulation which 
would involve no discrimination against the Victorian product’: North Eastern Dairy Co 
Limited v Dairy Authority of New South Wales (1975) 134 CLR 559, 608. 
67 Ibid 578. Mason J also noted that alternative means of obtaining a similar result were 
available – making it an offence to sell pasteurized milk which had not been pasteurised to the 
prescribed standard: at 608. 
68 Ibid 601 (Gibbs J). 
69 Ibid 589 (Barwick CJ). 
70 Ibid 608. The joint reasons in Betfair referred with approval to this extract from the judgment 
of Mason J in North Eastern Dairy: Betfair (2008) 234 CLR 418, 477. Again, the language 
used – specifically concepts of ‘discrimination’ – arguably means that the decision remains 
good law today notwithstanding the new approach heralded in Cole. 
2009 STATE-BASED BUSINESS LICENSING IN AUSTRALIA 181 
In Boyd v Carah Coaches Proprietary Limited,71
Gibbs J, for example, found that a statutory provision forbidding a person 
from carrying on an ordinary trade without a licence, and giving the licensing 
authority an uncontrolled discretion to refuse to grant a licence, could not be 
applied to interstate trade due to section 92.
 New South Wales 
regulations prohibited an individual or firm from carrying on business as a 
travel agent unless they held a licence. The regulations established a Travel 
Agents Registration Board, empowering it to issue licences at its discretion. 
Several criteria were noted as the basis for the exercise of the Board’s 
discretion, including whether or not the applicant was a fit and proper person 
to hold such a licence, and the adequacy of the applicant’s educational 
attainments or experience. Again, a majority of the High Court struck out the 
regulations as offensive to section 92. 
72 He objected to the ‘fit and 
proper’ criterion as involving an overly wide discretion.73 Similarly, Mason J 
objected to the power of the Board to refuse a licence on arbitrary and 
unspecified grounds which could be obnoxious to the concept of free trade 
guaranteed by section 92.74
Though most of the past cases have concerned the trade and commerce aspect 
of section 92, I should note that the section also protects ‘intercourse’ among 
the states. The High Court in Cole suggested a broader view of the protection 
to be given to the intercourse aspect of the section 
 
A constitutional guarantee of freedom of interstate intercourse, if it is to 
have substantial content, extends to a guarantee of personal freedom ‘to 
pass to and fro among the State without burden, hindrance or restriction.’75
Subsequent High Court decisions on the intercourse aspect of section 92 have 
focused on whether the purpose of the law is to burden interstate intercourse, 
 
                                                 
71 (1979) 145 CLR 78. Similar issues arose and a similar result ensued in Perre v Pollitt (1975) 
135 CLR 139. 
72 Boyd v Carah Coaches Proprietary Limited (1979) 145 CLR 78, 84. 
73 Ibid 85. 
74 Ibid 97. 
75 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 393 (citations omitted). It seemed at that stage that the 
right to freedom of intercourse was to be considered quite separately and distinctly from the 
right to freedom of trade and commerce: at 388. The right is similar to the privileges and 
immunities doctrine in the United States, which, as has been discussed above, has been 
interpreted to guarantee freedom of movement. 
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and whether the impediment to such intercourse is greater than is reasonably 
necessary in order to secure a legitimate object.76
There are several precedent examples, then, where the High Court has struck 
out business licensing schemes on the basis that their requirements are 
offensive to the economic unity that was envisaged by the founding fathers in 
constructing the section 92 freedom. While the test for invalidity of a 
provision under section 92 has changed, these cases can still be used to 
support an argument as to the invalidity of state licensing schemes, given that 
there are comments in the cases couched in the language of discrimination and 
protectionism. 
  
IV  FUTURE WORK FOR SECTION 92 TO DO 
Members of the High Court in the recent Betfair case have shown that they 
are willing to recognise the requirements and realities of the ‘new economy’ 
in interpreting section 92 of the Constitution. Business groups have been 
saying consistently that the economic realities of the 21st century in Australia 
today require that we move away from a state-based occupational licence 
regime, in order to free up labour to move to where it is most needed, and to 
where it can more efficiently be utilised. Again, this is not an issue that is 
unique to Australia. Other federations such as the United States and the 
European Union have recognised the right of a worker to move freely within 
the federation for work purposes, and to have their qualifications and skills 
recognised in the new state. This right is not absolute, but restrictions on such 
a freedom must be clearly justified. This is for sound economic reasons. 
Although we in Australia are always wary about applying solutions developed 
in other countries without adaptation to reflect local requirements, and 
although our constitutional provisions are expressed in different terms from 
foreign laws, it is submitted that, like the other jurisdictions discussed here, 
Australia needs to protect the right of free movement within the federation. 
The High Court clearly has the ability to do so through its interpretation of 
section 92 of the Australian Constitution.  
It is submitted that state-based licensing regimes remain vulnerable to 
challenge under section 92 of the Constitution, as currently interpreted, just as 
they have been challenged in the past. 
                                                 
76 APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 219 ALR 403; Cunliffe v 
Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272. See also James Stellios, ‘The Intercourse Limb of 
Section 92 and the High Court’s Decision in APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner 
(NSW)(2006) 17 Public Law Review 10. 
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A Example77
Assume that Rob is a licensed electrician in Western Australia, and wishes to 
work as an electrician in Queensland. If Queensland regulations required him 
to undergo further training to be able to work as an electrician in that state, or 
did not recognise his experience in Western Australia as fulfilling any work 
experience requirements for registration in Queensland, the Queensland 
regulations might be challengeable on (at least) two bases:
 
78
(a) that they interfere with freedom of intercourse among the States as 
it applies to Rob, on the basis that Rob would be moving to 
Queensland for work reasons, and if there are barriers to him being 
able to work there, he is less likely to move; 
 
(b) if Rob intends to move to Queensland permanently, that such 
restrictions interfere with trade and commerce among the States, by 
inhibiting someone who wishes to move between States for business 
purposes. American authorities establish that the movement of people 
can constitute commerce.79
If Rob wished to remain resident in Western Australia but merely fly to 
Queensland to work on some projects, as many service providers do, these 
regulations would even more seriously inhibit interstate trade and commerce. 
 
It is arguable that these state-based licensing schemes are at least prima facie 
designed to inhibit competition for work in the state imposing the 
requirements. The courts have been willing to go behind the claimed 
justification for laudable-sounding laws, to find out the real motivation for 
their enactment. In Hughes and North Eastern Dairy, the Court found as a fact 
that business licensing schemes had been passed for protectionist reasons. The 
High Court of Australia in Betfair and the United States Supreme Court have 
both referred to the need, in interpreting these kinds of provision, to allow 
competition if at all possible. Removing state-based restrictions on the right to 
practise a particular profession or trade, or at the very least requiring very 
strong justification for their retention, would assist in encouraging 
                                                 
77 This discussion takes place on the assumption of the continuing applicability of the Cole 
discriminatory protectionism test, though later it is briefly asked what the situation would be 
if, as some commentators suggest, evidence of protectionism were not required to be shown in 
order that an Act be found to be invalid according to section 92. 
78 I do not dwell here on arguments surrounding section 117 of the Constitution. However, 
however that section was, of course, applied to state-based restrictions on the right of a New 
South Wales resident to practise in Queensland in Street v Qld Bar Association (1989) 168 
CLR 461. 
79 Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (1954) 93 CLR 1. 
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competition among labour, and among service providers. It is sensible to 
interpret legal rules to provide for economically desirable outcomes. 
The states will probably seek to justify their regimes on non-protectionist 
grounds. The High Court’s ‘reasonable necessity’ test might be used to 
support their arguments; in other words, that the regulations are reasonably 
necessary to secure a legitimate objective. However, it might be expected to 
be a rare case where this test was satisfied. For example, it is hard to think of 
a genuine reason why a person licensed as a refrigeration mechanic in New 
South Wales should not have an automatic right to perform the same task in 
Victoria. Support for this approach is evident in past High Court decisions on 
section 92 such as Hughes and North Eastern Dairy, which recognised the 
potential for state-based licensing regimes to be anti-competitive.   
Some might argue that a state-based licensing regime is not discriminatory, 
since it applies to those who have lived locally for a long time, as well as to 
those who were licensed in another jurisdiction and have recently moved 
between states. It is true that the court has required there to be discrimination 
in order that an Act breach section 92.80 However, as indicated above, Mason 
J in North Eastern Dairy (who used the concept of discrimination in assessing 
the Act’s validity under section 92)81 found that, although in that case the 
requirement for milk sold to be certified by a licensed pasteuriser applied 
regardless of the milk’s origin, the Act was discriminatory,82
Further, we should recall that the provisions successfully challenged in Betfair 
did not apparently single out interstate trade and commerce for discriminatory 
treatment, yet were struck down. Further, in the section 117 case of Street v 
Queensland Bar Association, the High Court found that a residency 
requirement for legal practice in Queensland was discriminatory contrary to 
that section. The fact that the residency requirement applied to both local and 
interstate practitioners did not save the requirement from invalidity.
 providing an 
extra burden on interstate trade.  
83
                                                 
80 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 399 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, 
Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Permewan Wright Consolidated Proprietary Limited v Trewhitt 
(1979) 145 CLR 1. 
 There is 
no evidence that the concepts of freedom from discrimination are to be 
81 North Eastern Dairy Co Limited v Dairy Authority of New South Wales (1975) 134 CLR 559, 
608. 
82 The Privy Council in Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (1954) 93 CLR 1, 
22 also declared that ‘their Lordships have rejected the theory that because a law applies alike 
to inter-state commerce and to the domestic commerce of a state, it may escape objection 
notwithstanding that it prohibits restricts or burdens interstate commerce’. 
83 (1989) 168 CLR 461. 
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applied differently in the context of sections 92 and 117 and so the two 
sections are not considered here as giving rise to separate arguments. 
In the same way, regulations which state that a person who has obtained a 
particular qualification or trade or the right to practise in a field in one 
Australian jurisdiction must undergo further training or qualifications in 
another jurisdiction before practising there are also seen to be discriminatory. 
They require the person to jump through two hoops – the requirements of the 
jurisdiction whence they have come, and of the jurisdiction in which they are 
now seeking registration. The ‘two hoop’ or ‘double burden’ concept was 
recognised recently in the context of the European Union: 
The posting of a worker could not require the employer to comply with a 
second set of territorially applicable rules … in addition to those already 
complied with in the home country (unless there was a general interest 
justification for doing so). In all these cases, the double burden test works 
without difficulty; mutual recognition serves to protect a competitive 
advantage acquired under the rules applicable in the home state.84
Analogously (given the above quotation), in the section 92 case of Bath v 
Alston Holdings Pty Ltd,
  
85
As indicated above, on the current interpretations given to ‘discrimination’ in 
sections 92 and 117, a requirement which overturns a competitive advantage 
will be found to be discriminatory. We would then consider whether the 
discrimination was justified, using the High Court’s ‘reasonable necessity’ 
test from Betfair. The state pleading justification would have to make its case, 
citing the interests, presumably, of public safety or health. It would be hard to 
make this case when another state, the state of the person’s origin, had 
presumably made the assessment on similar grounds when giving the person 
the right to conduct the practice or business. Very strong evidence would need 
to be led by the state whose laws were under challenge, and the prima facie 
position would be that such laws were protectionist.
 a majority of the High Court invalidated a taxation 
provision that had the effect of removing a competitive advantage that lower-
cost interstate goods had.  
86 Although there is 
evidence that at least one founding father did not intend section 92 to apply to 
such licensing regimes,87
                                                 
84 Watt, above n 41, 26 (emphasis added). 
 this is not considered determinative of how the 
85 (1988) 165 CLR 411, 426 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ; Wilson, Dawson and 
Toohey JJ dissenting). 
86 Again, the High Court was prepared to conclude that licensing-based schemes were in fact 
protectionist in nature in Hughes and Vale and North Eastern Dairy. 
87 For example, Sir Samuel Griffith, commenting on the intended meaning of the section, 
claimed ‘it is clearly not proposed to interfere with the internal regulation of trade by means 
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section can be applied to a very different economy in the early years of the 
21st century.88
The High Court in section 92 has been concerned, in applying the ‘reasonable 
necessity’ test, with whether the claimed objectives of the legislation could be 
achieved in a manner that was less offensive to competition than the 
provisions of the challenged legislation.
 
89
B Should Evidence of a ‘Protectionist Purpose’ Be 
 Necessary in Applying Section 92? 
 Given the move to national 
standards in particular fields, I would suggest that, if states have genuine 
concerns about the standards that should be required for entry to particular 
trades or professions, the legitimate way to express these concerns is to 
participate in formulating the national standards, rather than trying to go it 
alone with their own regulations. 
The above discussion is premised on a need to prove that state-based licensing 
systems were introduced at least partly for protectionist purposes. As 
indicated, there is precedent for such schemes being viewed in this light.   
                                                                                                                    
of licences’ in ‘Notes on the Draft Federal Constitution Framed by the Adelaide Convention 
of 1897’ Queensland Legislative Council Journals (1897) 47 Part I, 12.  
88 Sir Anthony Mason has commented on the advent of rapid transportation and 
communications, and modern technology, resulting in the integration of trade within 
Australia: ‘The Australian Constitution 1901-1988’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 752. 
See also Windeyer J in Victoria v The Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 395. The High 
Court recently, in New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1, 97, referred to the 
idea of pursuing the intention of the founding fathers as more often than not pursuing a 
mirage. 
89 Betfair (2008) 234 CLR 418, 452 (joint reasons), North Eastern Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy 
Industry Authority of New South Wales (1975) 134 CLR 559, 578 (Barwick CJ) and 608 
(Mason J). This discussion takes place in the context of a broader debate about the meaning of 
‘proportionality’ as it is applied in section 92 cases. Some distinguish between robust 
proportionality and abstract proportionality. Robust proportionality considers three issues: the 
suitability of the measure used to achieve the desired end, whether the measure is necessary in 
that there are no alternative practical measures available, and whether the measure is 
excessive or disproportionate to the ends achieved or sought to be achieved. Abstract 
proportionality, on the other hand, considers only the last of these criteria. See, for further 
discussion of this issue, Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the 
Concept of Proportionality’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 4; Gonzalo 
Villalta Puig, The High Court of Australia and Section 92 of the Australian Constitution 
(2008) 145-54; Gonzalo Villalta Puig, ‘A European Saving Test for Section 92 of the 
Australian Constitution’ (2008) 13(1) Deakin Law Review 99, 106-112 and Amelia Simpson, 
‘Grounding the High Court’s Modern Section 92 Jurisprudence: The Case for Improper 
Purpose as the Touchstone’ (2005) 33(3) Federal Law Review 445. 
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However, it is worth pointing out that other writers have questioned whether 
there should be a need to prove a protectionist purpose in order that a law be 
found to have breached section 92. They argue that the section was included 
in the Constitution in order to create a common market. The argument is that, 
consistently with this purpose, laws which discriminate against interstate trade 
and commerce should be prima facie struck out as offensive to section 92, 
whether or not a purpose of protectionism can be shown. As one of the 
leading advocates of this reform measure argues: 
The narrowness of the scope [of the existing test] excludes many laws and 
measures from the jurisdiction of s 92 even though their purpose and effect 
may be to restrict the common market …90
These authors believe that section 92 was included in the Constitution with 
the intention that it would provide for a common market. This view is 
inconsistent with the view of history taken by the High Court in Cole, but 
enjoys some support among other commentators,
 
91 as well as being reflected 
in views of judges92
[T]he Court assumes a narrower and more workable role as the enforcer of 
one aspect of the achievement of economic unity in a federal system, the 
prevention of state protectionism resulting from the imposition of 
discriminatory burdens on interstate trade. If this be thought to be too 
narrow, it should be remembered that other kinds of laws or practices that 
detract from the achievement of an internal common market or otherwise 
threaten national economic unity (usually state laws or actions ...) may 
require different remedies, such as overriding national legislation or 
uniform agreement among the states.
 in some section 92 cases. A leading commentator on 
section 92 jurisprudence acknowledges that the current discriminatory 
protectionism test has its limitations: 
93
                                                 
90 Gonzalo Villalta Puig, The High Court of Australia and Section 92 of the Australian 
Constitution (2008) 121; Gonzalo Villalta Puig ‘A European Saving Test for Section 92 of the 
Australian Constitution’ (2008) 13(1) Deakin Law Review 99. 
 
91 For example, Dennis Rose ‘Federal Principles for the Interpretation of Section 92 of the 
Constitution’ (1972) 46 Australian Law Journal 371, 374: ‘The discrimination might be 
intended to serve protective purposes … but even if it is not actually intended to serve such 
purposes, it can nevertheless be reasonably held to infringe the “free trade” purpose of s 92’; 
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It is not proposed to dwell here on this discussion, since it is not the main 
focus of this article, but certainly it would be easier to challenge state-based 
licensing systems on the basis of section 92 if it were not necessary to show a 
purpose of protectionism. Mutual recognition among states of a business or 
occupational licence might be more consistent with the common market of 
which those above spoke in framing their views on the interpretation, and true 
purpose of, section 92. 
V CONCLUSION 
The recent High Court of Australia decision in Betfair has raised hopes that 
state-based licensing regimes could be challenged on the basis of the section 
92 freedom. A broad interpretation of the freedom of movement around 
Australia for work purposes, and a consequent narrow interpretation of the 
obstacles in the path of workers who wish to exercise that right, would be 
consistent with the approach taken in two other leading federations of the 
world. It is justified on economic efficiency grounds since it allows capital 
and labour to be put to more efficient uses. It might also better reflect the 
vision of the founding fathers that section 92 would serve to create a common 
market in Australia. 
Business groups have sought greater integration of Australia’s labour force, 
and have pointed to state-based licensing regimes as creating barriers and 
inhibiting business potential. While the law should not necessarily always be 
applied in a way that businesses want, all Australians benefit when companies 
based in Australia can operate more efficiently. Thus, state licensing schemes 
that do not recognise (truly) equivalent qualifications or experience gained 
elsewhere in Australia are discriminatory on the ‘two-hoops’ thesis. A state 
can argue for such a regime, but should be required to present very strong 
evidence as to how the laws meet the ‘reasonable necessity’ test. The law can 
thus be interpreted in a way that meets sound economic goals for the 
Australian federal system early in its second century. 
